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THE AUCTION MODEL WITH LOWEST RISK IN A 
DUOPOLISTIC ELECTRICITY MARKET 
 
ESTRELLA ALONSO Y JUAN TEJADA 
 
RESUMEN 
 
Este artículo modela la subasta del mercado eléctrico como un juego de dos 
jugadores de información incompleta bajo las hipótesis de empresas 
generadoras simétricas, neutrales al riesgo y con costes de producción 
independientes y privados. En Alonso and Tejada (2010) se define una amplia 
familia paramétrica de modelos de subasta que contiene a los modelos clásicos 
de subasta: uniforme, discriminatorio y de Vickrey. En el presente artículo se 
analiza la familia paramétrica de modelos de subasta mencionada desde el 
punto de vista del riesgo. Se diseña un modelo de subasta nuevo que se llamará 
DV, cuyo riesgo  es más bajo que el obtenido con cualquiera de los modelos 
clásicos. 
Clasificación JEL: D44 
Palabras Clave: subasta, VaR, mercado eléctrico. 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The present paper models the electricity market auction as a two-person game 
with incomplete information under the assumption that bidders are symmetric, 
risk neutral and have independent private costs. Alonso and Tejada (2010) 
define an extensive parametric family of auction models which contains the 
classic auction models; Uniform, Discriminatory and Vickrey auction models. 
The present paper analyzes this parametric family of auction models from the 
viewpoint of the risk. It develops a new auction model called DV, which has 
lower risk than any other classic auction model. 
JEL Classification: D44 
Keywords: auctions, Value at Risk, electricity market. 
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THE AUCTION MODEL WITH LOWEST RISK IN A 
DUOPOLISTIC ELECTRICITY MARKET1 
 
ESTRELLA ALONSO2 Y JUAN TEJADA3 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In many countries an auction model is used to regulate the daily Electricity 
Market (Fehr and Harbord, 1993). Each power company (female suppliers) 
bids an amount of electricity units and a unit price for each hour (or half hour) 
of the following day. From the supply side, the Market Operator (male 
auctioneer) ranks the bids from the lowest to the highest and then distributes 
the demand among the lowest bids, until the demand has been fully met. The 
price paid to each company taking part in the dispatch of the demand, depends 
on the auction model adopted for the transaction. There are two main auction 
models: the Uniform auction model and the Discriminatory auction model. 
Much debate has been going on about the advantages and disadvantages of 
these auction models (Ausubel and Cramton, 2002, Fabra, 2001, Fabra, et al., 
2002, Fabra et al., 2003), but no clear conclusion has been reached. 
In the literature, there are papers that argue in favour of the Uniform model 
(Wolfram, 1999) whilst others favour the Discriminatory model (Federico and 
Rahman, 2001). There are other auction models used in contexts outside the 
Electricity Market, such as the Vickrey auction model (Vickrey, 1961). 
One of the main difficulties is the fact that more than one object is being 
auctioned (the demand may be distributed among several companies) and the 
comparison between multiple-unit auction models is a very complex task. In 
single-unit auction models the solution is provided by the Revenue 
Equivalence Theorem (Myerson, 1981). This theorem is not generally 
applicable when the players wish to obtain more than one object, as it happens 
in electricity auctions.  
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Alonso and Tejada (2010) define an extensive parametric family of auction 
models, called General Auction Model (GAM), which contains the classic 
models mentioned above: Uniform, Discriminatory and Vickrey. They 
characterize the strictly monotone Bayesian Nash equilibrium in all auctions 
models belonging to GAM and they prove that GAM verifies the corresponding 
Revenue Equivalence Theorem. 
There is a wealth of literature that focuses in the optimal choice or design 
of auctions, usually from the point of view of the expected revenue (see, for 
example, Myerson, 1981; Riley and Samuelson, 1981). For this reason, if the 
Market Operator only takes into account the expected revenue, then every 
auction mechanism satisfying the Revenue Equivalence Theorem is indifferent 
for him. Nevertheless, an auction mechanism has to be selected. Consequently, 
Market Operator should take into account other criteria when making his 
decision. For instance, the criteria taken into account could be collusion 
(Robinson, 1985), another possible criteria could be variability (Vickrey, 
1961), and other criteria could be used. Regarding the variability criterion, 
Vickrey (1961) calculates the variance for first-price and English auctions. 
Waehrer, et al. (1998) prove that a risk-averse auctioneer prefers first-price 
auction to second-price auction, and second-price auction to English auction. 
Beltrán and Santamaría (2006) use a simulation to analyze the variation for 
several auction mechanisms with the same expected revenue. Krishna (2002) 
proves that the price distribution in second-price auction is a mean-preserving 
spread of the price distribution in first-price auction. 
The present paper starts from this point and develops a second criterion for 
the Market Operator that enables him to choose an appropriate auction model 
within the family. Therefore, the original contribution of the present paper is 
the analysis of risk measures applied to auction models potentially useful in 
the Electricity Market. 
Variance is not the only indicator of the sign of payment deviations whilst 
payment can be volatile and reach sudden high values. As the Market Operator 
is not affected if payment to suppliers is lower than expected, the present paper 
intends in obtaining a measure for the risk of losses for each auction model 
too. Given that loss, in this context, is to pay more than expected to suppliers. 
In this sense, the value at risk (VaR) measures the worst loss at a given 
confidence level and reflects how much can be lost with respect to expected at 
a certain probability (Holton, 2004). VaR is a risk measure used by financial 
institutions to study the market risk of their portfolios (Longerstaey and 
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Zangari, 1996). As previously stated, VaR could be very useful for helping the 
auctioneer to identify which auction mechanisms could be better when 
auctions are identical in terms of expected revenue but different in terms of 
risk losses. To establish a preference between the auction models, the variance 
and the VaR for Market Operator payment can be calculated in all auctions 
belonging to GAM and it can be found that under some conditions there are 
new auction models which have lower VaR than any other classic auction 
model.  
On the other hand, in almost all the papers related to the Electricity Market, 
the theoretical model is considered as a non-cooperative game with complete 
information (where the production costs of the suppliers are considered public 
knowledge). There are few articles that assume the existence of some 
uncertainty on the costs function of a rival company, all of which use the 
Uniform auction model; Ferrero et al. (1998) present a numerical example in a 
duopolistic market. Their paper considers that the costs are private but 
correlated (production costs are private information of each company, but both 
depend on the price of fuel). Bosco and Parisio (2001) study an electricity 
market with N suppliers, each with two production units. Their paper considers 
that companies are asymmetrical in terms of production capacity, but assumes 
that the Bayesian Nash equilibria are symmetrical. Schöne (2003) considers a 
duopolistic market with identical capacities. 
The present paper considers that bidders are symmetric and there exists 
some uncertainty on the cost function of the rival company, i.e., it models the 
electricity market auction as a game with incomplete information. This 
hypothesis assumes that the range of costs may be known for each plant type, 
but usually not all factors determining production costs are common 
knowledge.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the theoretical 
model to be analyzed is described and defined. Section 3, introduces the 
Bayesian Nash equilibrium for each auction model in the parametric family- as 
a particular case of the result obtained in Alonso and Tejada (2010). Section 4 
is devoted to comparing the auction models in the parametric family with 
respect to their variance and their VaR for Market Operator payment, 
respectively. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
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II. The theoretical model 
 
The following hypotheses in the market is assumed:  
There are two risk neutral suppliers     {1,2} competing to provide the 
electricity required and they have the same perfectly divisible capacity        
 Let {  ,  } be two independent and identically distributed random 
variables each uniform on       . Supplier   and only supplier  , observes the 
realization     of      and it gathers the uncertainty that company j has about 
the production cost of company i. If supplier i dispatches the amount    [0, 
1] then her production cost is    . 
The demand of a period is price-inelastic, known with certainty and it is 
given by     , where           and         . That is, the full capacity of   
suppliers and one supplier more to satisfy residual demand   are needed to 
satisfy full demand. 
 Each supplier          simultaneously and independently submits a bid 
        specifying the minimum unit-price offer at which she is willing to 
supply the whole of her capacity. 
A strategy for supplier           is a function                      . 
It can be assumed, given the symmetry of the suppliers, that          
      is the bid function used in the equilibrium by both companies, where 
      is a strictly monotone and differentiable function.  
Once the Market Operator has received the bids, he allocates the electricity 
distribution in such a manner that the lowest bidder will dispatch first. If the 
suppliers capacity is not enough to satisfy the entire demand, then the highest 
bidder will satisfy the residual demand.  
All aspects of this game and the auction model used, are assumed to be 
common knowledge (but the private information of each supplier cost). 
The price paid to each supplier depends on the auction model adopted for 
the transaction. There are three classic auction models: Uniform auction 
model, Discriminatory auction model and Vickrey auction model. 
In the Uniform auction model, the unit-price received by supplier   is equal 
to the highest accepted bid. All bidders dispatching into the market receive the 
same unit-price.  
In the Discriminatory auction model, the unit-price received by supplier   is 
equal to her own bid   . All bidders dispatching into the market could receive a 
different unit-price. 
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 In the Vickrey auction model, the rule used by the Market Operator to 
establish the price is more complicated than in the previous two models. The 
unit price received by supplier   dispatching in the market is equal to the bid of 
the supplier that   displaces, i.e., the unit price of the electricity unit needed to 
cover the demand if   removes her bid. 
The present paper discusses not only the three classic models, but in fact it 
also considers a parametric family of auction models which contains the three 
classic models as particular cases. This family has already been defined in 
Alonso and Tejada (2010) but for completeness it is also included in the 
present paper.  
Given the two bids,    denotes the bid of supplier   and    denotes the rival 
bid of supplier  . Formally, the parametric family of auction models is a set of 
auction models whose profit function (revenue minus cost) for supplier   is 
given by: 
 
              
                               
                                       
                                (1) 
 
where          ,                   are electricity units verifying       
     ,        . That is, if  ´s bid is the lowest, then i dispatches   
units and possibly receives different prices for the total units dispatched: 
  units by the unit price   ,    units by the unit price    and   units by the unit 
price 1, hence receives more than or equal to    times her own bid. On the 
other hand, if i´s bid is the highest, then i dispatches    units and possibly 
receives different prices for the total units dispatched:      units by the unit 
price    and   units by the unit price 1, hence receives more than or equal to 
   times her own bid.  
The values of          are completely determined by size of the demand: 
if       then (     )           if n = 1 then (               and, finally, 
if       then (     )           
 This family of auction models verifies two desirable principles for an 
auction model to avoid the winner´s curse (Thaler, 1988) and to ensure 
effciency Burguet (2000), respectively. First, the bid made by a company is the 
minimum unit price at which she is willing to supply the whole of her capacity 
and the Market Operator cannot pay a company a unit price lower than her 
own bid. Second, the company that has made the lowest bid enters the market 
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first and if it cannot satisfy all the demand, then the other company enters the 
market to dispatch the residual demand. 
Let´s refer to this parametric family of auction models as General Auction 
Model (GAM).  
Clearly, if  the values of the parameters         ,    are fixed, then the 
auction model used for the transaction is completely determined. Therefore we 
analyze the following different size demand cases are analyzed: 
Case 1.  Both suppliers have enough capacity to supply the whole demand, 
i.e., n = 0. In this case, the bidder with the lowest bid is the only one to 
dispatch. Then     ,     ,        and         and 
substituting into the expression 1, the GAM is reduced to a uni-parametric 
family with supplier i´s proft function: 
 
  
              
                              
           
                      (2) 
 
In particular, if     , the Uniform and Discriminatory auction models 
(U\D) is obtained. They are the same in this case. If now      the Vickrey 
auction model (V I) is obtained. 
Case 1 is, in fact, a particular case of single-unit (α) auction. Therefore, it is 
known beforehand that the Revenue Equivalence Theorem is applicable. 
Case 2.  The capacity of both suppliers is needed to satisfy demand but 
there is excess overall capacity, i.e., n = 1. In this case, the bidder with the 
lowest bid produces 1 and the other bidder produces the residual demand α. 
Then in this case      ,     ,        and              and 
substituting into the expression 1, the GAM is reduced to a bi-parametric 
family with supplier i´s profit function: 
 
  
                    
                                       
                         
     (3) 
 
where                 and          . 
In particular, if    = 0 and     , the Uniform auction model (UP) is 
obtained. If     = 1  and     , the Discriminatory auction model (DP) is 
obtained. Finally, if If     = 0  and     , we obtain the Vickrey auction 
model (VI). On the fourth vertex, i.e.        and   =  , there is a new 
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auction model that can be called DV auction (DV). Supplier i´s profit function 
in DV model is: 
 
  
                   
                         
                 
                            (4) 
 
That is, if i´s bid is the lowest then i dispatches her full own capacity and 
Market Operator pays her       units by the unit price    and   units by the 
unit price 1. On the other hand, if i´s bid is the highest, then i dispatches only α 
units and receives the unit price 1 for each dispatched units. 
DV is an auction model where the Market Operator pays to both suppliers α 
units by the unit price 1 and pays to bidder with the lowest bid the remaining 
dispatched units       multiply by her bid. DV is a mixture between 
Discriminatory and Vickrey auctions. 
Case 3. Demand exceeds overall capacity, i.e.     . In this case there is 
no competition. Both companies have guaranteed the dispatch of their entire 
capacity. The revenue for each supplier is 1 and the Market Operator pays 2. 
Obviously this is a trivial case. 
 
III. Bayesian Nash equilibrium 
 
Alonso and Tejada (2010) obtain the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of each 
auction model belonging to the family GAM where    is an independent 
realization of a continuous random variable   with c.d.f.  F and they proved 
the following proposition: 
Proposition 1. If an auction model S    GAM is used, then there exists a 
unique symmetric bayesian Nash equilibrium       = 1, given by: 
 
                           
 
     
                      
 
     
     
 
  
   
If       , 
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If             , 
 
          
 
If          
 
Proposition 1 reduces in the particular case with uniformly distributed 
random variable    in [0; 1], for  each demand size, to: 
 
       
      
    
                                (5) 
 
substituting                for the Case 1; and 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
             
   
  
   
  
   
  
                    
             
   
     
  
              
 
   
     
         
         
              (6) 
 
substituting           for the Case 2. 
Remark 2.  Note that, in equilibrium, supplier i offers a bid higher than or 
equal to   . In addition the Market Operator cannot pay a company a unit price 
lower than her own bid. Then a supplier never gets less than the cost of the 
amount that she produces, therefore the bidders do not incur in an ex post loss 
problem. A supplier playing the equilibrium gets a positive surplus winning in 
each case and in each auction model belong to GAM. 
Remark 3. Other possibility could be to bid different prices for the 
different electricity units but (Janssen et al., 2010) show that simultaneous 
pooled auctions with multiple bids do not have efficient equilibria under 
certain assumptions. This does not happen in any auction model belonging to 
GAM. 
Remark 4. The companies have the same expected revenue        and the 
same payment the Market Operator expects to make     , for every S   GAM 
(Alonso and Tejada, 2010). Moreover, the expected revenue of the companies 
and the payment the Market Operator expects to make are: 
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                                              (7) 
 
     
   
       
        
 
 
  
 
 
          
 
 
               
          
                                        (8)      
 
           
  
IV. Variance and value risk 
 
If the Market Operator observes only the payment he expects to make then 
every auction model is equivalent for him. However, the models can be 
different if one takes into account others criteria such as variability or risk for 
the Market Operator. In this Section we calculate the variance and the value at 
risk of the  Market Operator payment to suppliers at equilibrium in any auction 
model S   GAM are calculated. The Market Operator payment is given by the 
following random variable: 
 
    
   
               
                 
   
                     
                        
           (9) 
 
Where      is the highest and      is the second-highest order statistics of 
{        The Market Operator is given the opportunity to distinguish among 
the auction models by using these criteria. 
As it was discussed in the Introduction a usual way of addressing this issue 
is by means of the variance for this. The main problem of the variance is that it 
does not take into consideration if payments are below or above the expected 
payment. It is not the same for the Market Operator to pay above the expected 
payment, than to pay below the expected payment. As the Market Operator is 
not affected if payment to suppliers is lower than expected, the present paper 
also focuses in obtaining a measure for the risk of losses for each auction 
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model too. A widely used measure of the risk of loss in different economic 
contexts is the value at risk. See, for instance, Holton (2004). In the electrical 
context, it can be defined as follows: given confidence level  , VaR at   is the 
smallest number k such that, the probability that the difference between the 
actual payment and the expected payment is greater than k is less than 1-  , 
that is 
 
    
                                                                 (10) 
 
Note that if S   GAM then            given in Remark 4. On the other 
hand, to avoid the effect of       we can use the relative VaR (RVaR) that is 
given by: 
 
     
  
    
 
     
                                                                                         (11) 
 
The Market Operator pays a extra amount less than      
   of the 
expected payment, with probability greater than  . With     and      we 
can measure how much the Market Operator can pay over expected payment at 
a certain probability. 
 
IV.1. Variance in Case 1 
 
The variance of the payment that the Market operator makes in Case 1 is 
given by: 
 
                        
 
    
                     
             
      
  
  
 
 
       
  
 
 
 
                  (12) 
              
            
  
         
  
 
and replacing the corresponding value of    into the expression 12. Table 1 
lists the variance associated to VI auction model and U\D auction model. 
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Table 1. 
Variance of VI and U\D in Case 1 
 
 
The model with the lowest variance is U\D auction model. 
 
IV.2. Variance in Case 2 
 
The variance of the payment that the Market Operator makes in Case 2 is 
given by: 
                      
 
 
         
                   
            
 
  
 
 
            
 
 
       
 
  (13)   
 
and replacing the corresponding Bayesian Nash equilibrium into the 
expression 13, Table 2 presents the variance associated to four vertexes of the 
parametric family. 
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Table 2. 
Variance of V I, DV , UP and DP in Case 2. 
 
 
The model with the lowest variance is the new auction model DV. Then the 
DV auction model is the most attractive for Market Operator from the point of 
view of variance. 
 
IV.3. Value at risk in Case 1 
 
In this case the VaR can be expressed as 
 
    
           
  
 
       
  
 
                                               (14) 
                  
 
    
 
   
  
 
     
 
Replacing       , the corresponding distribution function of   , into the 
expression 14, the VaR and RVaR for VI and U\D can be obtained. They are 
presented  in Table 3. 
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Table 3. 
Expected revenue, distribution function, VaR and RVaR of VI and U\D in 
Case 1. 
 
 
Table 4.  
VaR and RVaR of UnD and V I at confidence level 0.95 for some values of 
α in Case 1. 
 
 
For example, if focused on the VI auction model then the Market Operator 
pays an extra amount less tan  46.2% of the expected payment, with 
probability greater than 0.95. The model with the lowest VaR is U\D auction 
model. Then the UnD auction model is the most attractive for Market Operator 
from the point of view of value at risk. 
 
IV.4. Value at risk in Case 2 
 
In this VaR can be written as 
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                           (15) 
               
 
          
 
   
 
 
           
 
The VaR and RVaR can be estimated for VI and DV because        can be 
obtained, the distribution function of    (given in Table 5). 
However in UP and DP is necessary to do a numerical computation to 
calculate the sample VaR because the corresponding distribution functions 
cannot be obtained. The sample VaR corresponds to the quantile     of the 
variable    - 
 
       that we simulate 100000 times. The steps for the 
simulation, for each value of  , are: obtain 100000 uniformly distributed 
random realizations in [0; 1] of        , substitute these values in the 
corresponding Bayesian Nash equilibrium getting a sample of the variable    -
 
 
       and, finally, calculate the quantile     of the obtained sample. 
 
Table 5. 
Expected revenue, distribution function, VaR and RVaR of the main four 
auction models in Case 2. 
 
 
Thus, the results reported in Table 6 were obtained. 
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Table 6. 
VaR and RVaR of the main four auction models at confidence level 0.95 
for some values of α 
 
 
For example, in the case of the DP auction model with α = 0.4 the Market 
Operator pays an extra amount less than 13.98% of the expected payment, with 
probability greater than 0.95. The model with the lowest VaR is the DV 
auction model. Then the DV auction model is the most attractive for Market 
Operator from the point of view of value at risk. 
Remark 5. The Table 6 contains values obtained by theoretical distributions 
and values obtained by simulation. The analytical data are the same, with the 
precision chosen, if all these values were approached by a simulation. 
 
V. Conclusions 
 
The present paper analyzes a parametric family of auction models called 
General Auction Models (GAM) defined in Alonso and Tejada (2010), which 
includes, as particular cases the Uniform, the Discriminatory and the Vickrey 
auction models. It assumes that bidders are symmetric, have identical 
production capacity, are risk neutral and have independent private costs. 
Alonso and Tejada (2010) obtain that there is a unique Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium for every auction model belonging to GAM. All auctions models 
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belonging to GAM have efficient equilibria and do not incur in ex post loss 
problems. These auction models are identical in terms of the revenue but differ 
in terms of loss risk. 
The present paper proposes the value at risk (VaR), a widely used risk 
measure in several economic contexts, as a possible criterion to differentiate 
between the auction models. Thus, it analyzes VaR on the Market Operator 
payment to suppliers at equilibrium and it obtains that auction model situated 
in the vertexes of GAM is more interesting for the Market Operator with 
respect to this criterion. With VaR the present paper measures how much the 
Market Operator can pay over expected payment at a certain probability. 
In these vertexes, it finds the classic auction models plus a new auction 
model called DV. According to VaR criterion, the Market Operator should 
choose the auction model with lowest VaR in each case. When the demand is 
less than 1 (Case 1), the lowest VaR model is Uniform/Discriminatory auction 
model. However, when the demand is more than 1 (Case 2), the lowest VaR 
model is the new auction model DV. It is also possible to calculate doing 
numerical computation the sample VaR and the sample RVaR for all auction 
model belonging to GAM, because all Bayesian Nash equilibrium are known. 
All auctions belonging to GAM not situated in the vertexes of GAM that were 
simulated have a greater VaR than the models listed as the lowest VaR model 
in both cases. 
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